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NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT UNDER ARTICLE 15




Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is a congres-
sional enactment that gives military commanders authority to
punish subordinates without judicial process. Article 15 serves
tuio main statutory purposes: first, it enables commanders to deal
swiftly with minor crimes; second, it protects subordinates from
the stigma of a court-martial conviction.
The Armed Forces have, however, used nonjudicial punishment
in ways not intended by Congress. Punishment does in fact stig-
matize and article 15 has been used to circumvent legal safe-
guards available at courts-martial. Moreover, the Navy's use of
article 15 has in some tragic instances led to death and serious
injury. Congressional action is needed to curb abuse of the non-
judicial punishment power.
INTRODUCTION
The United States military has had a form of summary nonjudi-
cial punishment since the Revolutionary War. In 1775 the Conti-
nental Congress authorized Navy commanding officers to punish
sailors at a proceeding known as "captain's mast."' Customs and
usages of the Service set vague penalty limits. Regulations and
laws were later passed that did specify what captains could do at
mast.
2
* The author wishes to thank Captain William C. Lynch, JAC-C, USN-RET,
for his suggestions and encouragement during the preparation of this Comment.
Research details and conclusions are, of course, the responsibility of the author
and do not represent any official position. The author is a special warfare officer in
the United States Regular Navy.
1. The Marine Corps refers to the nonjudicial punishment hearing as "office
hours," and the Army calls it "company punishment."
2. H.R. REP. No. 1612, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962). Historical facts on the
development of nonjudicial punishment prior to 1950 are taken from this source.
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The Articles of War, first passed by Congress in 1775, gave the
Army much less authority than the Navy to punish its members
without judicial process. In 1916 the Articles of War as amended
permitted Army commanders to restrict the liberty of enlisted
members for short duration, give them extra duty, withhold privi-
leges, and issue reprimands. Periodic changes to the Articles af-
ter 1916 extended the punishment to officers and allowed
forfeiture of small amounts of pay. The Air Force became subject
to the Articles of War in 1947.
In 1950 Congress approved legislation that defined what com-
manders of all Services could "award"3 as nonjudicial punish-
ment. Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (the
Code) specified maximum punishments that were categorized ac-
cording to the rank of both the offender and the officer imposing
punishment.4 Officers could have privileges withheld for two
weeks, be restricted to an area such as a base for two weeks, or
be ordered to forfeit one-half of one month's pay for one month.5
Enlisted personnel could be confined for seven days (three days-
on bread and water) if attached to or embarked in a vessel. They
could also be reduced in rank, be given two hours extra duty each
day for two weeks, or be restricted for two weeks.6 Punishments
could not be combined. Navy commanders could impose the har-
sher penalty of confinement on bread and water because Con-
gress believed that "the nature of naval operations at sea makes
these punishments desirable in such circumstances .... 7
A 1962 amendment to article 15 significantly expanded the au-
thority of commanders in all Services to award nonjudicial pun-
ishment, while at the same time increasing procedural safeguards
for the accused.8 The 1962 amendment served two main purposes.
The first was to "enable [commanders] to deal with minor disci-
plinary problems and offenses without resort to trial by court-
martial."9 The second was to prevent the stigma of a court-mar-
tial, "which ... [impairs] the efficiency and morale of the person
3. "Award" is used here in that peculiar military sense of winning a punish-
ment rather than a prize.
4. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), ch. 169, art. 15, 64 Stat. 112
(1950) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970)).
5. Id. art. 15(a)(1). This punishment could only be imposed if the officer
awarding it was one who exercised general court-martial jurisdiction, normally an
admiral or a general.
6. Id. art. 15(a)(2), 64 Stat. 113.
7. S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2234 (emphasis added).
8. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815
(1970).
9. S. REP. No. 1911, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2380; H.R. REP. No. 1612, srupra note 2, at 1.
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concerned."'O
Stiffer penalties encompassed denial of liberty, property, and
status." These penalties could be combined and apportioned.12
The greater the penalty allowed, however, the higher the rank re-
quirement for the officer assessing the penalty. This was to en-
sure "that the maximum authority given will be exercised only by
officers of maturity and experience."13
Punishments continued to be categorized according to rank. An
officer, for example, may now be punished by arrest in quarters
for thirty days .and forfeiture of one-half of one month's pay for
two months. This punishment may only be imposed by a general,
admiral or any officer exercising general court-martial jurisdic-
tion.14 Admonitions or written reprimands may be issued to an
officer. by any commanding officer.15 Enlisted members may be
punished by "correctional custody" for thirty days, forfeiture of
one-half of one month's pay for two months, and loss of rank.16
Navy enlisted members may still be confined for three days on
bread and water if attached to or embarked in a vessel.' 7
The role of the commander at an article 15 hearing is that of
judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense counsel.'8 He considers the
evidence under exceedingly flexible rules that vary among and
within the Services.19 Congress provided two safeguards against
10. S. REP. No. 1911, supra note 9, at 5 and 2381; see also HR. REP. No. 1612,
supra note 2, at 3.
11. UCMJ, art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970).
12. Id. art. 15(b), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1612, supra note 2, at 7.
14. UCMJ, art. 15(b) (1) (B) (i), (ii), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (1) (B) (i), (ii) (1970).
This is a partial listing of the most severe punishments that may be awarded an
officer.
15. Id. art. 15(b), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b).
16. Id. art. 15(b) (2) (H) (ii)-(iv), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (H) (ii)-(iv). Officers jun-
ior to majors and lieutenant commanders may award lesser punishments. See id.
art. 15(b) (2) (A)-(G), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (A)-(G).
17. Id. art. 15(b) (2) (A), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (A).
18. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE MANUAL For COuRTs-MARTIAL, para. 133
(rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MCM, 1969].
19. Compare MCM, 1969, para. 133a with MCM, 1969, para. 133b. Air Force
commanders imposing nonjudicial punishment need not do so pursuant to a per-
sonal hearing for the accused, unless such a hearing is requested. At this hearing,
the commander is under no duty to present facts of the case against the accused.
The accused may present evidence in his behalf The Navy commander must, ex-
cept under unusual circumstances, conduct a personal hearing for the accused and
must consider all facts at that hearing bearing on guilt or innocence. Within the
Navy some general court-martial authorities require that commanders imposing
nonjudicial punishment establish the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
abuse of this sweeping power: first, any service member, except
those attached to or embarked in a vessel, may elect trial by
court-martial in lieu of an article 15 hearing;20 second, all mem-
bers have the right to appeal nonjudicial punishment to the supe-
rior officer of the commander who imposes punishment.2 ' The
Code does not provide for judicial review of article 15 proceed-
ings, and neither the Service Courts of Military Review or the
Court of Military Appeals will hear appeals under the All Writs
Act.22 Nevertheless, some federal district courts have considered
appeals 23 and the Court of Claims will hear cases if punishment
affects pay and allowances. 24
Challenges to the constitutionality of article 15 have been un-
successful.25 In Middendorf v. Henry,26 for example, the Supreme
Court held that an accused at either a summary court-martial27 or
while others set no legal standard at all. Compare Commander Naval Surface
Force, United States Pacific Fleet, Legal Briefing Memorandum for Prospective
Commanding Officers, para. 3a (rev. Jan. 5, 1977) with Commander Naval Surface
Force, United States Atlantic Fleet, Instruction 5400.1a, art. 2706a (1978).
20. UCMJ, art. 15(a), 10 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970).
21. Id. art. 15(e), 10 U.S.C. § 815(e). Congress was also concerned that a com-
mander might shield a subordinate from court-martial by treating major offenses
as minor at an article 15 hearing. To reduce this possibility, article 15(f) provides:
"The imposition.., of punishment under this article for any act or omission is
not a bar to trial by court-martial for a serious ... offense growing out of the same
act or omission, and not properly punishable under this article. .. ."
22. Stewart v. Stevens, 5 M.J. 220 (C.M.A. 1978) (order dismissing petition for
extraordinary relief); Rogers v. St. George, 6 M.J. 558 (N.C.M.R. 1978). UCMJ, art.
66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1970), provides that certain specified court-martial sentences
may be appealed to Army, Navy and Air Force Courts of Military Review that are
staffed by active-duty military judges. UCMJ, art. 67(b), 10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (1970),
specifies that certain decisions of these courts of military review may be further
appealed to the civilian Court of Military Appeals.
23. See, e.g., Bennett v. Tarquin, 466 F. Supp. 257 (D. Hawaii 1979); Rew v.
Ward, 402 F. Supp. 331 (D. N.M. 1975).
24. See, e.g., Hagarty v. United States, 449 F.2d 352 (Ct. CL 1971); Conn. v.
United States, 376 F.2d 878 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see also Gross v. United States, 531 F.2d
482 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (confirming court's jurisdiction to hear appeal from special court-
martial, where sentence extends to forfeiture of pay and allowances); Jones v.
United States, 499 F.2d 631 (Ct. CL. 1974) (confirming court's jurisdiction to rule on
constitutionality of the summary court-martial).
25. The following law review articles treat the constitutionality issue in depth:
Imwinkelreid, The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J.
534 (1974); Note, Middendorf v. Henry: The Right to Counsel at Summary Courts-
Martial, 31 ARK. L. REV. 345 (1977); Note, A Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 72 MIc. L REV. 1431
(1974); Note, Nonjudicial Punishment in the Navy: Do the Rights to Counsel and
Due Process Stop at the Water's Edge?, 48 U. CoLO. L REV. 489 (1977); Note, The
Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15, 82 YALE L.J. 1481 (1973).
26. 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
27. Constitutional challenges such as Middendorf to the summary court-mar-
tial have generally subsumed nonjudicial punishment. It is argued that both pro-
ceedings deny basic due process. The summary court-martial is the lowest forum
in the three-tiered military courts-martial system. It ranks below the special and
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an article 15 hearing does not have a right to counsel under the
fifth and sixth amendments. The Court reasoned that nonjudicial
punishment is given pursuant to an administrative hearing, such
as one held on revocation of probation, and is not a criminal pro-
ceeding under the sixth amendment: "Article 15 punishment, con-
ducted personally by the accused's commanding officer, is an
administrative method of dealing with the most minor offenses. 28
The Court emphasized, as it has traditionally done,29 the distinc-
tive quality of military society with its need for swift, certain dis-
cipline.30 The Court also stressed that counsel- was unnecessary,
because neither nonjudicial punishment nor conviction by a sum-
mary court-martial carries a "stamp of bad character."3 1
There are indications, however, that the Armed Forces have not
used nonjudicial punishment as intended by Congress, and that
punishment does in fact carry a stamp of bad character. This
Comment examines how nonjudicial punishment has been mis-
used and makes recommendations to curb this misuse. Through
an analysis of legislative history, Executive orders, current mili-
tary regulations, and judicial decisions, the Comment focuses on
the gap between congressional precept and military practice in
the use of article 15. Particular attention is given misapplication
of article 15 to circumvent jurisdictional demands of courts-mar-
tial, the misuse of nonjudicial punishment as proof of bad charac-
ter, and excesses by the Navy in the administration of
correctional custody-a form of nonjudicial punishment. The
Comment also examines the assumption that there are unique
demands of shipboard duty, which justify denying those sailors
attached to or embarked in a vessel the right to refuse an article
15 hearing.
WHAT IS A MINOR OFFENSE?
Congress limited the scope of authority under article 15 to only
those acts or omissions that were minor violations of the Code.
Both the original enactment and the 1962 amendment place this
general courts-maitial in the kinds of cases it can decide and the amQunts of pun-
ishment it can assess. See UCMJ, arts. 18-20, 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-820 (1970).
28. 425 U.S. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743-52 (1974); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11, 17-18 (1955).
30. 425 U.S. at 45.
31. Id. at 39.
restriction on the commander.32 Although this is a limitation of
key importance the Code does not define a minor offense. Never-
theless, it appears from the legislative history of both the original
enactment and the 1962 amendment that Congress believed a mi-
nor offense to be "misconduct not involving moral turpitude or
any greater degree of criminality than is involved in the average
offense tried by summary court-martial."33
This definition was extended to permit some discretion by the
commander in determining whether an offense was minor. He
could consider, for example, the nature, time, and place of the
crime, together with the person committing it.34 This subjective
standard was strictly limited to only those offenses that could not
be objectively categorized as punishable by "death . . . or ...
confinement for one year or more .... ,,35
The House subcommittee that held extensive hearings on the
1962 amendment understood the term "minor" in the proposed
32. UCMJ, art. 15(a), 64 Stat. 112 (1950); UCMJ, art. 15(b), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b)
(1970).
33. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE ARMY MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, para.
118 (1949). The congressional report on the original article 15 adopted this defini-
tion to specify what was meant by the term "minor" in the legislation. S. REP. No.
486, supra note 7, at 2235. The definition was carried over from the Army Manual
to the new Defense Department Manual for Courts-Martial, which contained the
Executive order that implemented the UCMJ in 1951. The 1951 definition stated-
Whether an offense may be considered "minor" depends upon its na-
ture, the time and place of its commission, and the person committing it.
Generally speaking, the term includes misconduct not involving moral tur-
pitude or any greater degree of criminality than is involved in the average
offense tried by summary court-martial. An offense for which the punitive
article authorizes the death penalty or for which confinement for one year
or more is authorized is not a minor offense. Offenses such as larceny, for-
gery, maiming, and the like involve moral turpitude and are not to be
treated as minor. Escape from confinement, willful disobedience of a non-
commissioned officer or petty officer, and protracted absence without
leave are offenses which are more serious than the average offense tried
by summary courts-martial and should not ordinarily be treated as minor.
U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE MANUAL FOR CouRTs-MARTIAL, para. 128b (1951) (em-
phasis added).
Only enlisted men may be tried by summary court-martial for any noncapital
crime. The summary court is conducted by one officer, who is ordinarily not a law-
yer, and this officer makes findings of fact, rules on questions of law, and renders a
decision that is subject to appeal. Punishments are statutorily limited to a maxi-
mum of one month's confinement, hard labor without confinement for 45 days, re-
striction to specified limits for two months, or forfeiture of two-thirds pay for one
month. Punitive discharges may not be awarded and an accused may refuse a
summary court-martial and elect trial by special or general court-martial. UCMJ,
art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1970).
34. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE MANUAL FOR CouRTs-MARTIAL, para. 128b
(1951); U.S. DEPT OF THE ARmY, THE ARMY MANUAL FOR CouRrs-MARTLu, para. 118
(1949).
35. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, THE MANUAL FOR COURTs-IARTIAL, para. 128b
(1951); U.S. DEP'T OF THE ArMY, THE ARmY MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIa, para. 118
(1949).
844
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legislation, to be as defined in the 1951 Manual for Courts-Mar-
tial.36 The subcommittee chairman, Mendel Rivers, believed the
dividing line between minor and major crimes to be analogous to
that separating misdemeanors from felonies. 37 Congress did not
suggest during the hearings and debates that article 15 should be
used for felonies. On the contrary, the amendment permits re-
viewing authorities to set aside nonjudicial punishment improp-
erly awarded for a serious offense and try that offense at a court-
martial.38
Congress was also concerned that the Services might, through
regulation and Executive order, expand the limits of punishment.
This was a concern strongly argued before Congress by the Amer-
ican Legion, an organization that opposed several parts of the
original Defense Department proposal to amend article 15.39 Con-
gressman Rivers agreed with the Legion position, because he
thought it preferable to "live under the law [rather] than under
Executive order or regulation."40
36. On the subject of what constituted a minor offense, the leading military
spokesman for the amendment, Major General Kuhfeld, USAF, emphasized that
"minor" meant what was stated in the 1951 Manual. This was brought out in the
following dialogue between the General and members of the House subcommittee:
Mr. Hardy: General, one thing I would like to understand and it may
have already been cleared up. This whole article 15 refers to minor of-
fenses.
General Kuhfelch That is right, sir.
Mr. Hardy: Now how is the term "minor offenses" defined? Is it defined
in the act?
General Kuhfeld. It is not defined in ihe act specifically, but it is defined
in the [19511 Manual... the definition that has been used and is now in
the Manual is that an offense which normally would be considered by a
summary court, which is the equivalent of a police court in civilian life,
just a police court.
General Kuhfeld: Mr. Hardy, here is the definition that we have been fol-
lowing all the time, that is in the Manual ....
Mr. Rivers: Then you get into the area of a misdemeanor or a felony.
General Kuhfeld. Yes, sir.
Proposed Amendment to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hear-
ings on H.R. 11257 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on Armed Services,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4900, 4920 (1962) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as 1962
House Hearings ].
37. Id. A federal felony is an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for
more than one year; all other offenses are misdemeanors. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
38. UCMJ, art. 15(f), 10 U.S.C. § 815(f) (1970).
39.. Letter from Mr. John Finn to Hon. L. Mendel Rivers (Apr. 5, 1962), re-
printed in H.R. REP. No. 1612, supra note 2, at 507.
40. 1962 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 4900.
Owing to this concern, shared by the Senate,4 1 article 15 spells
out in detail how the President and Service Secretaries may im-
plement the law. No expansion of authority is allowed, only limi-
tations.4 2 Nonetheless, the 1963 Executive order that put the
amendment into effect did expand the commander's authority by
re-defining a minor offense. 43 This re-definition and its adoption
in later Service regulations4 4 was done without congressional ap-
proval, and the felony-misdemeanor distinction relied upon by
Congressman Rivers and others has been obliterated.
The 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial, which incorporates the 1963
redefinition, states that the "term [minor] ordinarily does not in-
clude misconduct... [punishable] by... confinement for more
than one year."45
This insertion of the qualifier, ordinarily, removes the absolute
bar against nonjudicial punishment for crimes punishable as felo-
nies in effect at the time of the 1962 amendment. A commander
may now choose to treat such offenses as minor and within his ar-
ticle 15 jurisdiction. The Armed Forces encourage him to do so by
emphasizing that consideration of maximum imposable sentences
in determining whether an offense is minor is "not a hard and fast
rule...."4
It has been argued that despite any express authority to extend
article 15 jurisdiction by broadening the meaning of a minor of-
fense, such a broadening works to the advantage of the accused.
It is therefore in keeping with the spirit of the legislation. This
argument points out that "Congress was ... concerned lest the
President and the military ... attempt to expand nonjudicial
punishment to the detriment of the accused."4 7 If courts accept
punishment imposed under the broadened definition as a bar to
subsequent court-martial, then "the problem is somewhat circular
41. Proposed Amendment to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
Hearings on H.R. 11257 Before Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Services Comm.,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 24 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 11257].
42. "Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, and under such
additional regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, limita-
tions may be placed on the powers granted by this article.. ." UCMJ, art. 15(a),
10 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
43. Exec. Order No. 11,081, 3 C.F.R. 702, 704 (1963) (order amending the 1951
Manual for Courts-Martial). The Army Board of Review, an intermediate military
appellate court staffed by active-duty officers, quickly reified this extra-legislative
change to the meaning of "minor." United States v. Rosencrons, 34 C.M.R. 512, 514
(A.B.R. 1963).
44. See, e.g., United States Army Regulation (AR) 27-10, change 12, para. 3-3d
.(Dec. 12, 1973).
45. MCM, 1969, supra note 18, para. 128b.
46. AR 27-10, change 12, para. 3-3d (Dec. 12, 1973).
47. Captain Miller, A Long Look at Article 15, 28 Mm, L. REv. 37, 65 (1965).
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... [because] the broadened concept ... seems to have been
contemplated by Congress, and furthers Congress' announced re-
medial purpose of the new legislation."43
This conclusion raises two important questions. Have the
courts in fact accepted the expanded determination of minor as a
bar to trial by court-martial for the same offense? Does the ex-
panded article 15 jurisdiction truly benefit the accused in most
cases? If the answer to these questions is "no," then the problem
of the Executive exceeding the authority granted by Congress is
not at all circular the benign aspect of article 15 has been seri-
ously eroded.
Military appellate court decisions since 1960 that deal with the
issue of what constitutes a minor offense reveal that on balance
the accused has fared badly.49 In handing down these decisions,
the courts have adopted a subjective approach to determine
whether an offense is minor. With one exception,50 the courts
have rejected the notion that minor offenses are equivalent to
misdemeanors under federal civilian law.
United States v. Fretwell5 l is the leading precedent for a subjec-
tive standard to judge if an offense is minor and within article 15
jurisdiction.5 2 Lt. Fretwell was charged with being drunk on duty
while his ship was in drydock for repairs. He was first given non-
judicial punishment by his commander, but the commander's su-
perior determined that the offense was not minor and convened a
general court-martial under article 15(f). The Court of Military
Appeals affirmed Lt. Fretwell's conviction and found that the com-
mander had mistakenly decided the offense was minor. The non-
judicial punishment was not a bar to later trial. The court made
48. Id.
49. See United States v. Harding, 11 C.M.A. 67, 29 C.MR. 490 (C.M.A. 1960);
United States v. Fretwell, 11 C.M. 377, 29 C.M.1R 193 (C.MA. 1960); United States
v. Cross, 2 MvLJ. 1057 (A.C.AM.R. 1976); United States v. Brakefield, 43 CaM.R. 828
(A.C.M.R. 1971); United States v. Crump, 39 CM.LR 899 (A.F.CAM.R 1968); United
States v. George, 35 C.I.R. 801 (A.B.R. 1965); United States v. Rosencrons, 34
C.M.R. 512 (A.BJ. 1963); United States v. Wharton, 33 CIVM. 729 (A.FB.TL 1963);
United States v. Gonzalez, 32 C.M.RL 475 (A.B.R. 1962); see also United States v.
Joseph, 11 M.J. 333 (CI.A. 1981).
Very few cases since 1960 have barred subsequent trial by court-martial for an
offense previously dealt with at an article 15 hearing. See United States v. Silk, 37
C.M.t. 523 (ABIL 1966); United States v. West, 35 C.ML.L 639 (A.B.R. 1965).
50. See United States v. Domenech, 18 C.M.A. 314 (1969).
51. 11 C.M.A. 377 (1960) (2-1 decision; Ferguson, J., dissenting).
52. See cases cited supra note 49.
this finding although the crime was punishable by neither a dis-
honorable discharge nor by confinement for more than one year.
The court considered maximum imposable punishments, but the
two-judge majority placed much greater weight on subjective ele-
ments: the time and place of the offense, the accused, and the de-
gree of criminality involved.53 The dissenting judge wrote a
strong opinion that supported the felony-misdemeanor distinction
for minor crimes.54
In the civilian judiciary, the Court of Claims initially adopted a
position similar to that of the Fretwell dissent. In Hagarty v.
United States55 the court relied on a largely objective standard to
hold that a commander had abused his discretion by treating the
offense of fraud as minor. Unlike the situation in Fretwell, this
abuse of discretion harmed the accused by denying him rights
available at a court-martial.
Petty officer Hagarty had served the Navy as a steward for more
than nineteen years without disciplinary problems. He was an E-
6 (a senior enlisted grade just below that of chief petty officer),
and was eligible to retire in this grade upon completion of twenty
years' active duty. Shortly before his retirement he was charged
with improperly accounting for $600.00 in receipts and disburse-
ments. He was taken to captain's mast aboard the USS Keller;
because he was attached to a ship he could not refuse mast. No
firm evidence was presented to support the charge. Nonetheless,
"the Captain pounded his fists together and stated that plaintiff's
case called for a bust .... ,,56
The results of this "bust" (a reduction in pay grade to E-5)
reached far beyond the few months that Hagarty had left in the
Navy. His retirement pay was reduced because he would draw
this pay over his lifetime at a lower rate.57 Depending on how long
he lived, this could have amounted to several thousand dollars.
53. 11 C.MA. at 379-80.
54. In his dissent, Judge Ferguson rejected the majority position that a subjec-
tive yardstick should be used to measure the severity of an offense. He criticized
this approach as "personal justice with a vengeance [that] effectively substitutes
for the judgment of Congress and the President our individual reaction as judges
to the facts of each case." 11 CM.A. at 382. Judge Ferguson would have treated
felonies as serious offenses and all others as minor.
It is... apparent that the maximum punishment thus authorized falls be-
low the traditional dividing line between misdemeanors and felonies...
we must hold that drunkenness on duty in time of peace is, as a matter of
law, a 'minor offense' .... Neither a dishonorable discharge nor confine-
ment in excess of one year is authorized for the delict.
Id. at 383; see also United States v. Harding, 29 C.IVLPR 490, 493 (C.M.A. 1960) (2-1
decision; Ferguson, J., dissenting).
55. 449 F.2d 352 (Ct. CL 1971).
56. Id. at 354.
57. See id. at 356.
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The actual and potential loss of earnings gave Hagarty standing
for an appeal to the Court of Claims.58
In finding for Petty Officer Hagarty, the court held that the of-
fenses charged were not minor. More importantly, the court con-
cluded "that the requirement that offenses be minor is
jurisdictional, so that nonjudicial punishment imposed under this
article for an offense which is not minor is void and inva-
lid.... ."59 The court suggested that special circumstances might
qualify a case as minor despite maximum punishments. The
court emphasized, however, that "this interpretation necessarily
requires that the record in each case must establish proof that the
offense charged was a 'minor' offense." 60
The Court of Claims found such circumstances in its most re-
cent interpretation of what constitutes a minor offense. In 1980
the court held that purchase and use of heroin by a sailor in Hong
Kong was a minor crime, although this crime, if tried by a general
court-martial, is punishable by a dishonorable discharge and con-
finement at hard labor for up to two years.6 ' The court quoted
with favor the 1969 Manual definition of a minor offense and
stressed that the qualifier, ordinarily, gave the commander article
15 jurisdiction over an otherwise serious crime.6 2
In sum, the Court of Claims now takes a position virtually the
same as that of the Court of Military Appeals in Fretwell and its
progeny. This position is not based on congressional enactment.
It relies instead on an Executive broadening of the term " minor"
that now appears in the 1969 Manual. This re-definition has
worked largely to the detriment of the service member caught up
in an article 15 proceeding, and is particularly harmful to the
sailor on a ship who cannot demand a court-martial. The practice
of both civilian and military courts with respect to article 15 juris-
diction has not, on the whole, favored the accused. Nor has this
practice "distinctly [furthered] Congress' announced remedial
58. See supra text accompanying note 24.
59. 449 F.2d at 359.
60. Id.
61. Capella v. United States, 624 F.2d 976 (Ct. CL 1980).
62. Id. at 979. Unlike the Hagarty decision, the court in Capella upheld the
commander's decision and made it clear that the subjective standard controlled.
"[Wle think that the commanding officer has broad discretion to determine
whether [an] . . .offense is sufficiently serious to warrant court-martial rather
than nonjudicial punishment under Article 15." Id. at 978.
purpose of the... legislation."63
ARTICLE 15 AS A MEANS TO CIRCUmvENT JURISDICTIONAL LMIITS
PLACED ON COURTS-MARTIAL
Four jurisdictional requirements must be satisfied before a per-
son may be tried by court-martial.64 The court must be convened
by an officer empowered to do so; membership must be correct
with regard to numbers and competency; the court must have
personal jurisdiction; the court must have jurisdiction over the of-
fense charged, i.e., the offense must be a violation of the Code
and "service connected." The requirements for establishing juris-
diction over the person and the offense have become increasingly
burdensome for the military.
Article 15 offers a convenient means to reduce the risk that an
offense will be dismissed on either of these grounds. It is particu-
larly attractive for the Navy because of the proviso in article 15(a)
that persons attached to or embarked in a vessel may not obtain
the safeguards of a court-martial. At first glance it may seem that
there is a significant loss of punishment power by disposing of a
court-martial offense at an article 15 hearing, but the Navy has at-
tached administrative consequences to these hearings that make
them much more potent than provided for in the Code. Before
discussing specific examples of how the Navy has proceeded in
this area, it will be useful to briefly review major cases that have
shaped the law of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the person begins at the time of enlistment
and ordinarily ends with the delivery of discharge papers.65 The
traditional rule was that fraudulent enlistment would not void an
enlistment contract if it could be shown that the enlistee had ac-
cepted benefits of the Service such as pay and allowances. 66 The
Court of Military Appeals carved out an important exception to
this "constructive enlistment" theory in two decisions: United
States v. Catlow67 and United States v. Russo.68 These cases held
that where a person was coerced to enlist, or enlisted through
willful misconduct on the part of the recruiter, the enlistments
were void. Any attempt by the military to later prosecute people
serving under these contracts would fail for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
63. Miller, supra note 47, at 65.
64. MCM, 1969, supra note 18, para. 8.
65. Id. paras. 9, 11.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Overton, 9 C.M.A. 684 (1958).
67. 48 C.M.R. 758 (C.M.A. 1974).
68. 50 C.MILR. 650 (C.M.A. 1975).
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Recruiter misconduct turned out to be wide-spread and
"Catlow-Russo" motions were routinely filed and upheld.69 Even
if these motions were denied, it was costly to bring recruiters
great distances to testify about their conduct in the enlistment of
an accused. Disposition of an offense at a counselless article 15
hearing greatly reduced the chance that this legal issue would be
raised. If the issue was raised, the commander would be under
no obligation to bring the recruiter to testify as required at a
court-martial.70
Article 5 of the Code states that the Code applies in all places.71
Subject matter jurisdiction had therefore simply been a question
of establishing that a person subject to the Code had committed
an offense under the Code. It did not matter where the offense
was committed or under what circumstances. The Supreme
Court changed this by its 1969 decision in O'Callahan v. Parker,72
which required that an offense be "service connected" before it
could be tried by court-martial. The Court pointed out that mem-
bers of the Armed Forces tried by court-martial were denied im-
portant constitutional rights to indictment by grand jury and trial
by a jury of peers.73 To guarantee these rights as often as possi-
ble, the Court held that offenses cognizable in civilian courts
should be tried in these courts, if the nature, time, and place of
69. The Navy found recruiter misconduct to be so burdensome on subsequent
courts-martial of illegally enlisted service members that it lobbied Congress to
change the law. The Chief of Naval Operations hailed this change as "closing the
Catlow/Rsso loophole, with resulting favorable impacts on good order and disci-
pline." T. HAYWARD, CNO REPoRT (FY 1981) (a report by the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations to Congress prepared by the Navy Internal Relations Activity, Office of the
Chief of Information, Washington, D.C.). Recruiter misconduct itself appears to
march on. See, e.g., Navy Concedes Recruiters Helped in Test Cheating, San Diego
Union, June 6, 1981, at A3, col. 1; see also Sterrit, Recruiter Misconduct, 30 JAG J.
105 (1978).
70. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE NAVY, MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAI,§ 0101d(2) (1978). Section 0101d(2) states:
The elemental hearing requirements of paragraph 133b, MCM, are ex-
panded to provide that when there are controverted questions of fact con-
cerning the suspected offense, witnesses, if present on the same ship,
camp, station, or otherwise available, shall be called to testify if this can
be done at no cost to the Government.
If an accused aboard ship wished to raise the issue of a coerced enlistment or re-
cruiter misconduct, he would have no right under this provision to compel testi-
mony of a recruiter if such testimony could be had only by bringing the recruiter
to the hearing at government expense.
71. UCMJ, art. 5, 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1970).
72. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
73. Id. at 273-74.
the crime did not show a "service connection."74 A later Supreme
Court case, Relford v. Commandant,75 more precisely defined
"service connection. '76
Following O'Callahan and Relford, the Court of Military Ap-
peals generally ruled than any crime not petty,77 which is commit-
ted by Armed Forces personnel in the United States outside a
military base, is not "service connected" if subject to prosecution
in a civilian court.78 This approach made it particularly difficult
for the military to prosecute off-base drug violations punishable
under the Code by more than six months' confinement. 79 Addi-
tionally, if these violations were for use and possession only, it
was unlikely that civilian prosecutors would bring them to trial.
This was especially true in some states with large military popu-
lations such as California and Hawaii.80
Shortly after O'Callahan, the Secretary of the Navy sent a
message to all commanders explaining the impact of that decision
on the court-martial system. The message was careful to point
out that "punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, is not affected by
the decision."81 Under this authority, Navy commanders have
employed article 15 to avoid jurisdictional and other "technical"
requirements of courts-martial.82
Because the Navy does not publicly report on this practice, it is
74. Id. at 272.
75. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
76. See id. at 365.
77. See United States v. Sharkey, 19 C.MA. 26 (1969).
78. See United States v. Klink, 5 M.J. 404 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Alef, 3
M.T. 414 (C.M.A 1977). But see United States v. McCarthy, 52 C.M.R. 123 (C.M.A.
1976).
79. In a recent, major departure from its position that off-base drug activity by
military people was generally not "service connected," the Court of Military Ap-
peals held that "almost every involvement of service personnel with commerce in
drugs is 'service-connected.' United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (CVI.A. 1980).
This expansive view of "service connection" conflicts sharply with federal dis-
trict court decisions that require a much stronger showing of "service connection"
for military courts to try drug-related offenses. See, e.g., Schroth v. Warner, 353 F.
Supp. 1032 (D. Hawaii 1973) (no court-martial jurisdiction for on-base drug offense
where accused was off-duty in civilian clothes), and Redmond v. Warner, 355 F.
Supp. 812 (D. Hawaii 1973) (no court-martial jurisdiction where marijuana sold off-
base by off-duty marine in civilian clothes).
80. See generally United States v. McCarthy, 52 CAM.RI 123, 129 (C.M.A. 1976)
(Cook, J., concurring).
81. Secretary of the Navy message 052224Z of June 1969 (SECNAVNOTE
5820).
82. A Navy commander, writing in a professional journal, attacked the Court
of Military Appeals for its "technical requirements [that have] removed the line
officer from the military legal system." Commander Bonds, Punishment Disci-
pline, and the Naval Profession, NAVAL INST. PROc. Dec. 12, 1978, at 48. Com-
mander Bonds added that "Captain's Mast is the most valuable tool remaining to
those responsible to the nation for discipline in the military service." Id. at 49.
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difficult to calculate how often mast is used to avoid dismissal of
charges as a matter of law at courts-martial. Examples do, how-
ever, surface occasionally to confirm the Navy's use of nonjudicial
punishment in this fashion.
A Navy man provided such an example when he petitioned the
Court of Military Appeals for extraordinary relief from nonjudi-
cial punishment. Petty officer Paul Stewart was taken to mast for
six off-base marijuana offenses.83 His commanding officer had first
asked Navy lawyers to prosecute the offenses at a special court-
martial. They told him that lack of "service connection" would
frustrate attempts for a court-martial conviction. The command-
ing officer then disposed of the offenses at mast. Stewart re-
quested trial by court-martial but this request was denied
because he was attached to a ship.
The Code does not grant judicial review of mast proceedings.
Stewart therefore petitioned the Court of Military Appeals under
the All Writs Act.84 During jurisdictional hearings, Chief Judge
Fletcher "asked a Navy lawyer if the Services believed that com-
manders could use article 15 to 'circumvent the law of the land.
You believe this was the intent of Congress?' 85 Despite Chief
Judge Fletcher's concern, the court ruled that it lacked jurisdic-
tion to grant relief from nonjudicial punishment.86
Recent command action aboard the USS Denver illustrates how
article 15 may be used not only to defeat the "service connection"
issue, but also a civilian dismissal of charges for insufficient evi-
dence. Six crew members of the Denver were arrested while on
liberty in Oakland, California, and charged with robbery.87 The
charges stemmed from an incident that took place off-base, off-
duty, and in a United States civilian jurisdiction empowered to try
the felony charges. The charges were dismissed against three of
83. The facts of this case are taken from CMA Eyes Role in Article 15 Cases,
Navy Times, May 15, 1978, at 26, col 1.
84. For the Court of Military Appeals' reasoning to consider petitions under
the All Writs Act, see McPhail v. United States, 1 M.J. 457 (C.M.A. 1976).
85. Quoted in Navy Times, May 15, 1978, at 26, coL 4.
86. Stewart v. Stevens, 5 M.J. 220 (C.M.A. 1978) (order dismissing petition for
extraordinary relief). Federal civilian courts, unlike the Court of Military Appeals,
have accepted petitions for review of nonjudicial punishment. See, e.g., cases cited
supra notes 23-24. At least one district court has held that "service connection"
must be proved for a commander to have article 15 jurisdiction. See Bennett v.
Tarquin, 466 F. Supp. 257, 258 (D. Hawaii 1979) (granting writ of habeas corpus as
to three petitioners).
87. USS Denver message 021630Z of March 1981.
the crew members for insufficient evidence.8 8 Nonetheless, one of
these crew members was later taken to mast and found guilty by
the commanding officer, who wrote: "The dismissal of civil
charges notwithstanding, more than sufficient documentary evi-
dence existed to substantiate each charge."89 The commanding
officer in this summary fashion substituted his judgment for that
of a civilian officer of the court, who had not found probable cause
to try the crew member.
Misuse of nonjudicial punishment is even more onerous be-
cause of serious administrative consequences that an awardee
may suffer beyond the punishment itself. Another example of
Navy practice in this area reveals how serious these conse-
quences may be.
In 1978 seventeen sailors attached to the nuclear submarine,
USS Thomas A. Edison, went to mast on charges for use and pos-
session of marijuana.90 Owing to the nature of submarine duty,
i.e., extended patrols, two crews are assigned each submarine.
The Navy calls these crews, "blue" and "gold." While one crew is
embarked in the submarine for the three-month patrol, the "off-
crew" is ashore for training and leave. All persons taken to mast
were members of the "blue" or "off-crew." Although these sailors
were ashore in Hawaii when the alleged offenses took place, with
their submarine several thousand miles away in Guam, the Navy
denied their request for court-martial. The Navy proceeded on
the narrow legal theory that the sailors had orders to the subma-
rine, and were therefore "attached" to it regardless of its remote
location.9' The sailors were punished based on the testimony of
one shipmate. The most severe punishment was sixty days re-
striction, reduction in rank, and a fine of $300. But all punish-
ments triggered automatic removal under Naval regulations from
nuclear submarine duty. This removal cost the sailors their
monthly submarine pay of sixty dollars. It also cost them their
eligibility for a $15,000 reenlistment bonus.92
This is not to suggest that the Navy be lenient with submarine
sailors who use marijuana; however, given the harsh administra-
tive penalties that attend punishment for "minor" drug offenses at
mast, it appears that an adversary hearing such as a court-martial
88. Id.
89. USS Denver message 131601Z of March 1981.
90. The facts of this case are taken from Bennett v. Tarquin, 466 F. Supp. 257
(D. Hawaii 1979).
91. See id. at 260 for other indicia of "attachment" argued successfully by the
government.
92. DEPT op DEFENSE, MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES ENTTEMENT IMANUAL
art. 1130, table 2-1-1 (1978).
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should be available before imposing these penalties. The fairness
of this requirement is more compelling when it may be satisfied
without impairing the readiness of a vessel actually at sea.
The legislative history of the 1962 amendment does not support
a conclusion that Congress intended these harsh penalties to
blossom from an award of nonjudicial punishment. The debates
and hearings on the amendment emphasize time and again the
short-term nature of punishment and its remedial, protective
goals.
Representative Sikes, for example, stated that the amendment
would ensure that "fine young men will escape bearing a mark on
their record for the rest of their lives... matters of discipline will
be better handled with less injury to the individual .... ,,93
Senator Douglas believed that the new article 15 would "strike a
nice balance... between the need for military discipline and the
protection of the rights of enlisted men particularly ... we at-
tempted to protect enlisted men from the arbitrary use of power
by commanding officers."94
Representative Rivers said that "it would be safe [to summa-
rize] the position of all... that.., the basic objective is to actu-
ally benefit the offender so that he will not have to be tried by a
summary court .... ,,95
Contrary to this congressional emphasis on the benefits of arti-
cle 15 for military people, all Services have used non-judicial pun-
ishment to inflict serious, long-term administrative and legal
penalties. These penalties are next examined as they relate to
unsuitability for government service and civilian employment,
their use at courts-martial to support sentences that include dis-
honorable discharges, and their role in creating prison records for
service women jailed in federal penitentiaries.
NONJUmICIAL PUNISHMENT AS A STAMP OF BAD CHARACTER
A major purpose of the 1962 amendment was to prevent minor
disciplinary infractions from plaguing a service member through-
out a military career and jeopardizing civilian employment.96 Con-
gressional hearings and reports stress the importance of this
93. 108 CONG. REC. 8429 (1962).
94. Id. at 17560.
95. 1962 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 4944.
96. H.R. REP. No. 1612, supra note 2, at 3.
purpose. Senator Ervin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, said: "I am much in favor of the overall objective of
the bill. I think it is very unfortunate to have a tremendous
number of courts-martial for relatively minor offenses. It makes a
bad record against a man."9 7
Representative Rivers echoed this concern: "Here is our philos-
ophy: deterrence and salvaging an individual, to deter him from
doing what he is doing and to save his career in the future."98
General Kuhfeld, the leading Defense Department spokesman
before the Rivers subcommittee, emphasized the military's appar-
ent desire to see the service member freed from the long-term
damage of minor disciplinary action: "[I]t [nonjudicial punish-
ment] will not constitute a previous conviction for any purpose
nor time lost nor a permanent blot on the individual's military
record which willfollow him into civilian life."99
House subcommittee members closely questioned Defense offi-
cials about article 15 record-keeping to ensure that punishment
would not be used for other than the immediate, limited purpose
of reforming minor breaches of discipline:
Mr. Blandford: Well, General, let me ask you this question on adminis-
trative discharges. Supposing a man has three article 15 punishments,
and they transfer him to another command. Now you say the records at
that point do not follow him.
General Kuhfelch Under the present rule.
Mr. Blandford: Are those records forwarded to headquarters, US Air
Force, or to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the JAG or Adjutant Gen-
eral, the Army?
General Kuhfeld. [W]hen he is transferred from the command it goes
out, that is all.
Mr. Blandford When you say "goes out" where does it go to?
General Kuhfeld Destroyed, no longer kept.100
Since enactment of the amendment, military practice in the use
of nonjudicial punishment records has been at odds with both the
spirit of the legislation and the testimony of those officers who
urged its passage. Congress did not mean for nonjudicial punish-
ment to have a lasting influence on a person's discharge, military
career prospects, civilian employment opportunities, or personal
97. Hearings on H.R. 11257, supra note 41, at 32 (emphasis added).
98. 1962 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 4937 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 4956 (emphasis added).
100. Id. General Kuhfeld, an Air Force officer, described the record-keeping
practices for his Service only. Army and Navy practices were somewhat different,
but the emphasis was on the short duration of the records. Records in the Navy
were said to be kept only for a person's enlistment. Id, at 4964. Army records
were described as being kept on fie at the unit level for two years after transfer of
the awardee. Thereafter they were "retired and sent to the Army's record holding
center in St. Louis." Id. at 4965 (testimony of CoL Ackroyd).
[VOL. 19: 839, 1982] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
reputation. Nonetheless, Executive orders and Service regula-
tions now permit all these harmful effects. Article 15 records are
used to justify less than honorable discharges,' 0 ' permanently
threaten promotion and retirement, 02 deny duty assignments, 03
and increase the severity of courts-martial sentences." 4
Of course the longer the record is active, the greater the chance
it will be used for one of these damaging purposes. Notwithstand-
ing General Kuhfeld's representations to the House subcommit-
tee in 1962, his Service has permitted use of article 15 records
throughout an Air Force member's career to administratively sep-
arate him from the Air Force.105 Although the discharge may be
"honorable" despite being based on misconduct, the form used to
document the separation (DD Form 214) contains coded informa-
tion that alerts potential employers, especially government em-
ployers, to the reason for discharge.106
In 1978 the Air Force Court of Military Review upheld an Air
Force regulation that authorized use of nonjudicial punishment
records to increase the severity of a sentence at a court-martial
for an unrelated offense. The regulation provided that these
records could be used if punishment had been awarded within six
years of the court-martial. 0 7
In 1980 the US General Accounting Office (GAO) published a
report that, among other things, criticized the practice of perma-
nently maintaining nonjudicial punishment records. 08 The Air
Force vigorously opposed the GAO suggestion that these records
101. See, e.g., BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL MANUAL (BUPERSMAN) para.
3420185 (1978); see also Denton v. Secretary of Air Force, 483 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1973);
Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 1967 (Ct CL 1967); Rew v. Ward, 402 F. Supp. 331
(D. N.M. 1975).
102. See, e.g., AR 27-10, paras. 3-15b(1) (c), -15b(2) (c) (1979); see also United
States v. Kelley, 3 MJ. 535 (A.C.M.R. 1977).
103. See, e.g., Bennett v. Tarquin, 466 F. Supp. 257 (D. Hawaii 1979).
104. See MCM, 1969, supra note 18, para. 76d.
105. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTnG OFFICE, BETTER ADMINISTRATION OF THE
MlTARY'S ARTICLE 15 PUNISHMENTS FOR MINOR OFFENSES IS NEEDED 45 (1980).
106. In Rew v. Ward a federal district court held that such an administrative
discharge based in part on nonjudicial punishment jeopardized an Air Force en-
listed woman's opportunity to gain employment in either the public or private sec-
tor. "a discharge under AFM 39-10 is a bar to reenlistment in all branches of the
armed forces. More importantly... it could impair civilian employment with the
federal government and the private sector." 402 F. Supp. 331, 340 (D. N.M. 1975).
107. United States v. Mercier, 5 M.J. 866 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977).
108. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BETTER ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILI-
TARY'S ARTICLE 15 PUNmSHMENTS FOR MINOR OFFENSES IS NEEDED 45-50 (1980).
not be maintained. The Air Force now believes that the records
"are needed for several important reasons: when forfeiture or re-
duction [in rank] is ordered; as a general management tool; and
for use in subsequent complaints, litigation or records correction
cases.
1 09
The current Air Force policy for use of article 15 records is obvi-
ously not as represented by General Kuhfeld before Congress.
The records are not "destroyed, no longer kept"110 when people
transfer from one Air Force unit to another. Furthermore, the Air
Force now insists that such destruction would frustrate its need
for a "general personnel management tool"' There is no hint of
this need in the hearings on the amendment, nor is there any in-
dication that Congress wished for the records to be used in this
way. On the contrary, it is plain from the hearings that Congress
opposed long-term use.112
The Army also permits nonjudicial punishment records to
plague a soldier throughout his career.1 3 The rule stated by the
Army before Congress in 1962 now has limited application." 4
Only those enlisted persons serving their first three-year term
may have all records of punishment destroyed after two years." 5
Enlisted members with more than three years active duty have
their punishment recorded permanently in an Official Military
Personnel File (OMPF) at the Army Enlisted Records Center,
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana."Z6 These records are not, in
short, "retired" as suggested by the Army in congressional
testimony.li7
Records of punishment for Army officers are treated like those
109. Memorandum from Stuart R. Reichart, Department of the Air Force Gen-
eral Counsel, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Mapower, Reserve Affairs
and Logistics) (June 27, 1980).
110. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 109.
112. The following comments by members of the House subcommittee illus-
trate their belief that nonjudicial punishment records should not be permanently
maintained and used for any purpose:
Mr. Hardy- The thing that we are concerned with here... we are talk-
ing about this not being a blemish on the man's record, then we ought to
put a cut-off period... for which these documents... can be used for
administrative discharge purposes.
Mr. Blandford: Two years is a reasonable period.
Mr. Hardy: For any purpose.
1962 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 4968 (emphasis added).
113. Letter from CoL Donald W. Hansen, Chief, Criminal Law Division, US
Army Judge Advocate General Corps, to W.R. Salisbury (Mar. 26, 1981) (on Me
with the San Diego Law Review).
114. See supra note 100 (Col. Ackroyd's testimony).
115. AR 27-10, change 20, para. 3-15c(3) (d) (Aug. 15, 1980).
116. Id. para. 3-15c(2) (a).
117. See supra note 100 (CoL Ackroyd's testimony).
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of career enlisted soldiers.11S No matter where officer or enlisted
records are kept,19 the Army is clear that these records "may be
used as competent authority may direct and nothing in this [in-
struction for records] is intended to affect the admissibility of
nonjudicial punishment records at courts-martial and administra-
tive proceedings, regardless of where such records are filed.,,120
The remedial purpose of the amendment is not couched in
terms that apply only to first-term enlisted persons. z2 1 Indeed,
prior to enactment of the amendment, the Court of Military Ap-
peals recognized that protection against the impact of punish-
ment on an officer's career was particularly needed. The court
concluded "that an officer who has one record of an Article 15...
might just as well make his plans to get out of the Service." 2
Regardless of this conclusion and the rehabilitative spirit of the
amendment for all military people, Army practice remains largely
unchanged. The 1977 case of United States v. Kelleyi 23 demon-
strates how an officer perceives the threat to career.of a single re-
mote punishment.
Captain Kelley began his service as an Air Force enlisted man.
He completed a four-year tour and was presented a good conduct
ribbon.124 He then enlisted in the Army in 1966, was selected for
officer candidate school, and gained a commission in 1967. During
his brief time as an Army enlisted man he was punished under
article 15. Beyond this single disciplinary action, his career in the
Army was marked by achievement: he fought in Vietnam, re-
ceived the Bronze Star and Army Commendation medals, served
118. AR 27-10, change 20, para. 3-15c(1) (d). Nonjudicial punishment results for
Army officers may, at the commander's discretion, be fied permanently in the per-
formance section of personnel records maintained at Army Headquarters in Alex-
andria, Virginia.
119. The Military Personnel Records Jacket (MPRJ) accompanies the Army
member from unit to unit; the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) is main-
tained at a national headquarters. A commander imposing nonjudicial punish-
ment has limited discretion in determining whether punishment is to be recorded
in the MPRJ or the OMPF. The Army has determined that some minor offenses
are more minor than others, and it is these most minor offenses that may be filed
at the local level AR 27-10, change 20, para. 3-15b (Aug. 15, 1980).
120. Id. para. 3-15g.
121. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
122. U.S. CouRT OF M=a'rARY APPEALS, ANNuAL REPORT 26-27 (Jan. 1, 1960-Dec.
31, 1960).
123. 3 M.J. 535 (A.C.MR. 1977).
124 Id. at 538, 539. All facts of Captain Kelley's career are taken from these
pages.
as a company commander in the elite 82nd Airborne Division,
earned a college degree, and attended an Army Advance Course.
Even with this fine record, Captain Kelley faced possible separa-
tion from the Army as part of a Reduction in Force (RIF) after
the Vietnam War.
Captain Kelley went to the Army Military Personnel Center, Al-
exandria, Virginia, to review his file that would be used to deter-
mine if he would be part of the RIF. The file contained his
enlisted nonjudicial punishment imposed nine years earlier. Cap-
tain Kelley was "very concerned" at finding the document. He ar-
gued with the custodian of the fie, a Sergeant Dey, that the
punishment should not be recorded. Sergeant Dey advised him
that "the document was in the fie pursuant to Army Regula-
tions.... Soon thereafter [Captain Kelley] returned the file and
the receptionist observed that the Article 15 was missing. She re-
ported the fact to Sergeant Dey ..... 2"125
Captain Kelley was tried by a general court-martial for remov-
ing the document. He was found guilty and dismissed from the
Service.
Women in the Navy form another class uniquely disadvantaged
by record-keeping requirements that flow from nonjudicial pun-
ishment. The 1962 amendment establishes two ways military peo-
ple may be confined in areas other than where they live or work.
First, they may be placed in "correctional custody" for up to
thirty days. 126 This custody is normally served in minimum secur-
ity areas apart from other prisoners. 127 Second, lower-ranking en-
listed persons attached to or embarked in a vessel may be placed
in solitary confinement for three days on bread and water.128
Enlisted Navy women for years have been without facilities to
serve either correctional custody or confinement. 129 The Navy re-
fuses to mix women with men for these purposes, and has instead
confined women in federal penitentiaries such as the Metropoli-
tan Correctional Center ii San Diego, California.30 Because of
the booking procedures at these penitentiaries, Navy women im-
125. Id. at 536.
126. UCMJ, art 15(b) (2) (H) (ii), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (H) (ii) (1970).
127. See, e.g., AR 27-10, change 20, para. 3-8c(2) (c).
128. UCMJ, art. 15(b) (2) (A), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (A) (1970).
129. [USS] Norton Sound Woman Sailor Was a Prisoner in IMetropolitan Cor-
rectional Center], San Diego Union, July 10, 1980, at B9, col 1.
130. Id. at Bi, coL 1. The Navy believes that confinement of its women sailors
in civilian penal institutions is a "sensitive issue," and monitors the situation
closely; however, the practice is justified as being the best method presently avail-
able "to ensure equality in corrections and that discipline is afforded all Navy of-
fenders who warrant such punishment." Commander, Naval Base San Diego
message 082258Z of Dec. 1980.
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prisoned for minor offenses receive federal prison records. Prison
officials send the women's identification data, including photo-
graphs and fingerprints, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) National Identification Center.'13
The attorney for an eighteen-year-old Navy woman, who was
confined in the San Diego Metropolitan Correctional Center after
a captain's mast aboard the USS Norton Sound, said that her cli-
ent "now has a criminal record for life." Susan McGreivy, an at-
torney for the American Civil Liberties Union, also criticized
Navy administrative proceedings in general, because "they rely
on purely hearsay evidence to make decisions that do great harm.
What is worse, [the Navy] makes it difficult if not impossible [for
defense attorneys] at administrative hearings to challenge the
truth of some affidavits by refusing to make [affiants] available
for cross-examination." 32
Perhaps the strongest example of how nonjudicial punishment
is used as a stamp of bad character for all military people is
through its introduction at court-martial to increase a sentence.
Although Congress intended that nonjudicial punishment be used
131. [USS] Norton Sound Woman Sailor Was a Prsoner in [Metropolitan Cor-
rectional Center], San Diego Union, July 10, 1980, at B9, coL 1. The arrest record
created for women serving nonjudicial punishment for minor offenses at federal
penitentiaries frustrates the congressional purpose behind the 1962 amendment of
protecting the Service member from long-term employment disabilities and social
stigma. Writing of such a record in general, a federal appeals court noted that
there is "an undoubted 'social stigma' involved in an arrest record .... An arrest
record often proves to be a substantial barrier to employment." Menard v. Saxbe,
498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For a description of the FBrs practices in
maintaining and disseminating files such as those created for Navy women in fed-
eral penitentiaries, see generally Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(transmission of local arrest records to FBI).
The Navy has very recently begun opening its own correctional facilities for wo-
men on a limited scale. In September 1980 a women's correctional custody unit
was opened at Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego, California. The unit had a
capacity for twenty-five women, but was closed down temporarily one year later
for lack of supervisory personnel Naval Air Station Miramar message 172313Z of
Feb. 1981 and message 310015Z of Oct. 1981. The Navy continues to use the Metro-
politan Correctional Center, with its booking requirements that result in federal
arrest records, as a "cost effective measure where short periods of confinement are
involved." Commander, Naval Base San Diego message 082258Z of Dec. 1980.
132. Interview with Susan McGreivy, staff attorney with the Los Angeles office
of the American Civil Liberties Union (Apr. 5, 1982). Ms. McGreivy said that the
Navy refused to produce civilian investigators who helped prepare cases against
her clients, so that she could cross-examine. Ms. McGreivy said that the Navy
claimed lack of jurisdiction over these investigators because of their civilian sta-
tus. Nonetheless, Navy boards relied heavily on reports prepared by the investiga-
tors to discharge sailors.
to remove minor offenses from the court-martial system, the 1969
Manual inserts these offenses back into the system. It does so by
permitting their consideration in sentencing at any later court-
martial-even one totally unrelated to the nonjudicial punish-
ment-as proof of "the past conduct and performance of the ac-
cused.'13 3 Military prosecutors, judges, and juries routinely rely
on former nonjudicial punishment as evidence of bad character.
Bad conduct and dishonorable discharges are awarded based in
part on this evidence.134
The serious administrative and judicial consequences of article
15 punishment have not gone unnoticed by the Court of Military
Appeals. In United States v. Booker,135 then-Chief Judge Fletcher
wrote the majority opinion that required legal counsel for all serv-
ice people before they submitted to an article 15 hearing. Absent
counsel or written waiver of counsel, results of the hearing could
not be used to increase a sentence at any later court-martial.136
The court also limited "summary courts-martial to disciplinary ac-
tions concerned solely with minor military offenses unknown in
civilian society."137
The Armed Forces, particularly the Navy, reacted strongly to
this ruling. Since Booker the Navy has pushed a court-packing
plan to increase the size of the Court of Military Appeals,138 and
lower courts of military review, staffed by active-duty officers,
have eroded the protections of Booker.139
133. MCM, 1969, supra note 18, para. 76d.
134. See, e.g., United States v. McLemore, 10 M.J. 238 (C.M.A. 1981); United
States v. Mack, 9 MJ. 300 (C.M. 1980); United States v. Barlow, 9 M.J. 214
(C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Negrone, 9 M.J. 171 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v.
Lania, 9 M.J. 100 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. Mathews, 6 M.J. 357 (C.MA 1979);
United States v. Dukes, 5 M.J. 71 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Terrel, 8 M.J. 705
(A.F.C.MR. 1980); United States v. Clark, 7 M.TJ. 917 (A.C.M.R. 1979); United States
v. Arvie, 7 M.J. 768 (A.C.M.R 1979); United States v. Williams, 7 M.J. 725 (A.C.IR.
1979); United States v. Nordstrom, 5 M.J. 528 (N.C.M.R. 1978); United States v.
Penn, 5 M.J. 514 (N.C.M.I. 1978).
135. 3 MJ. 443 (C.M.A. 1977), vacated in part, 5 M.J. 246 (C.MAA. 1978).
136. United States v. Booker, 3 M.J. 443, 448 (C.I.A. 1977).
137. Id. at 447.
138. T. HAYWARn, =upra note 69, at 24.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Nordstrom, 5 M.J. 528 (N.C.M.RI 1978) (records of
nonjudicial punishment awarded to person attached to ship admissible at subse-
quent court-martial although no opportunity to consult with counsel or refuse
punishment). In Nordstrom, the Booker opinion was denounced in strong terms:
I think it can be reasonably said... that the Booker decision is simply a
pseudo-rational manipulation .... It smacks of a sort of youthful, one-
sided idealism aimed at providing every protection conceivable for mili-
tary wrongdoers .... [I]f we legitimize Booker by passively accepting it,
without protest, as representative of communicable and credible legal rea-
soning, then in my opinion, there can be no further honest thinking in mil-
itary law.
Id. at 533.
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The Court of Military Appeals has retreated from its original
position in face of this military dissatisfaction and censure. That
part of Booker restricting summary courts to minor military of-
fenses has been expressly overruled.140 The court has also re-
fused to apply Booker retroactively,141 and has confirmed use of
nonjudicial punishment to increase a court-martial sentence even
though the record shows neither waiver of counsel nor fact of con-
sultation.142 The court has further held that Booker does not ap-
ply to people attached to a ship. 43 Pressure for Justice Fletcher's
removal from the court has been unsuccessful, but he is no longer
Chief Judge.44
The court's refusal to extend Booker to persons attached to a
ship is in keeping with the special treatment traditionally af-
forded these persons when they find themselves before the bar of
military justice. Does the ship-board environment of a modern,
peace-time Navy justify denial of legal protections enjoyed by
other military people? Today's aircraft carrier may have a crew of
more than four thousand that includes lawyers, doctors, chap-
lains, and even civilian professors embarked to provide college
degree opportunities. 45 The carrier is a far cry from Walt Whit-
man's solitary, "freighted ship tacking speeds away under her
grey sails."'46 Instead, the carrier is a technological marvel con-
tinually in touch with the world through sophisticated satellite
communications, and is regularly provisioned by a host of support
ships and aircraft. The carrier with good reason is often referred
to as a "floating city."' 47
140. United States v. Booker, 5 M.T. 246 (C.M.A. 1978).
141. United States v. Syro, 7 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1979).
142. United States v. Mack, 9 M.T. 300, 322 (C.M.A. 1980).
143. Id. at 320.
144. Military Court Chief Replaced, San Diego Union, Apr. 27, 1980, at A26, col
1.
145. See, e.g., More than 1,000 Complete College Aboard Ranger, San Diego Dis-
patch, June 4, 1981, at 18, coL 1.
146. Whitman, Aboard at a Ship's Helm, in THE POCKET BOOK OF MODERN
VERSE 39 (0. Williams ed. 1958).
147. See, e.g., Kitty Hawk Shoves Off with a Strange Cargo, San Diego Union,
Jan. 7, 1982, at B1, col 2. The aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk was used by the Navy to
transport the families and household goods of crew members when the ship trans-
ferred home ports from San Diego to Bremerton, Washington. The carrier "be-
came a floating city for sailors and their families [during] the five day voyage." 1d.
at B3, coL 6; see also Phone Credit Cards Tested Aboard Indy, Navy Times, Jan. 18,
1982, at 2, coL 1. Crew members aboard the aircraft carrier Independence have
been issued telephone credit cards and phones have been installed throughout the
Assuming that operations at sea are still sufficiently isolated
and perilous to warrant denial of legal counsel for sailors faced
with an article 15, should such counsel be refused sailors working
aboard a ship in drydock? What if these sailors live in a down-
town San Diego hotel? 48 Should these hotel-bound sailors be de-
nied the right to refuse nonjudicial punishment? These and
associated questions are next explored within the contours of
congressional intent as applied to article 15 for military persons
attached to or embarked in a vessel.149
THE CONTEMPORARY NATURE OF COMMAND AT SEA: DOES IT
WARRANT HARSH PUNISHMENT POWER?
Congressional Attitudes and Navy Practice
Navy commanders have historically enjoyed greater summary
powers than other military officers. The Continental Congress
placed no specific limits on the authority of a ship's captain over
his crew. The captain could "imprison and also inflict reasonable
corporal punishment upon a seaman, for disobedience to reason-
able commands, or for disorderly, riotous or insolent conduct."150
The argument for these broad powers assumed that each time a
ship left port it was so vulnerable to the forces of nature that a
highly-trained, tightly-disciplined crew was needed to bring her
safely home. The need for this crew was even more pressing
when an armed enemy barred the way.
To ensure that a crew was properly disciplined, the Navy tradi-
tionally resorted to harsh, immediate punishment-sometimes
with serious or even fatal consequences for the offending sailor.'5 '
ship. The sailors "can now call home from most ports without fumbling for change
or without reversing the charges." Id.
148. See, e.g., 270 Sailors to Move into Grant Hotel, San Diego Transcript, Mar.
5,1981, at 1, col. 3. These sailors were the crew of the USS Vancouver, a Navy ship
undergoing extensive renovation by a civilian repair firm in San Diego. They were
expected to stay in the Grant Hotel for at least five months and perhaps longer
during the renovation. When asked by a reporter if placing sailors in hotels was
unusual, a Navy spokeswoman replied: "Well, it's been done in the Navy before,
but we think this is the first time it's happened in San Diego. We just don't have
room for the crew on base," Id. The Navy also billets crews of ships in overhaul
at the Oakwood Apartments in Coronado, California, a suburb of San Diego.
149. UCMJ, art. 15(a), (b) (2) (A), 10 U.S.C. § 815(a), (b) (2) (A) (1970).
150. 3 KENT Co~mmNTAPs 181, 182, quoted in H.R. REP. No. 1612, supra note 2,
at 2.
151. In 1840 three crew members were summarily hanged aboard the USS
Somers on suspicion of inciting mutiny. One of the dead men was Philip Spencer,
son of the Secretary of War, and there was great public outcry against the execu-
tions. The commanding officer of the Somers, Captain MacKenzie, was court-mar-
tialed for the hangings and acquitted. The Somers incident became the basis for
Herbert Melville's classic, Billy Budd. J. DIMoNA, GREAT COURT MARTIAL CASES
43 (1972).
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Of course today the Navy is much more than iron men and
wooden ships. A large shore establishment supports modern
fleets and many Navy personnel seldom set afoot aboard ship for
years at a time.
Partly in recognition of this change in the way the Navy oper-
ates, Congress has increasingly restricted the disciplinary author-
ity previously enjoyed by all Navy commanders. The original
article 15 limited the kinds and amounts of punishment that Navy
officers could award without trial.152 Ships' captains, however,
were still permitted the widest range punishment in recognition
of "the nature of naval operations at sea."153 No sailor, either
aboard ship or ashore, was given the right to elect court-martial
instead of nonjudicial punishment. This right was granted by reg-
ulation to members of the Army and Air Force.154
The debate over unequal treatment for sailors was intense
before passage of the 1962 amendment.155 The most influential
proponent of continuing this treatment in some form was Repre-
sentative Rivers. He argued that the "law of the sea is different
from the law of other things. This is ageless and age-old."' 56 Rep-
resentative Rivers noted that "when the master of the ship leaves
port, he has to come home."'5l 7
Several Congressmen were nonetheless troubled by this dis-
152. UCMJ, art. 15(a), 64 Stat. 112 (1950).
153. S. REP. No. 486, supra note 7, at 2234 (emphasis added). Only those Navy
officers in command of persons attached to or embarked in a vessel could impose
this punishment. Such commanders could confine persons on bread and water for
five consecutive days. UCMJ, art. 15(a) (2) (E), (F), 64 Stat. 113 (1950).
154. S. REP. No. 486, supra note 7, at 2234.
155. The following comments by Senator Ervin are typical of the concern felt
by many over unequal treatment for this class of military personnel:
The subcommittee on Constitutional Rights ... received a number of
complaints from lawyers to the effect that the Navy should be compelled
to give the same option which the Army and Air Force give .... I
brought this question up [of unequal treatment] because, frankly, I had
more misgivings expressed about that one thing ... than any provision of
the bill.
Proposed Amendment to Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hear-
ings on H.R. 11257 Before Subcomm. of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 32 (1962).
The American Legion opposed any discriminatory treatment whereby some mil-
itary people were denied rights enjoyed by others. See Letter from John Finn,
Chairman, Special Committee on UCMJ and the U.S. Court of Military Appeals of
the American Legion, to Hon. L. Mendel Rivers (Apr. 5, 1962), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 1612, supra note 2, at 5.
156. 1962 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 4900.
157. Id. at 4905 (emphasis added).
crimination. Representative Bates asked a Navy spokesman,
"what is wrong with making the Services the same? ... You
might have somebody, like in the 'Caine Mutiny'... where you
have this unusual commanding officer, and when an individual is
willing to take a gamble with a court-martial. Why should he be
denied it when he is accorded it in the other Services?" 5 8
The Navy spokesman insisted that swift, certain punishment
was needed to make article 15 effective: "So, if the ship is at sea-
if a submarine is on an extended cruise and the man says 'No,
Captain, I want a court-martial!'-it may be weeks and weeks
before the ship gets to a place where he can be tried .... -"159
This dialogue, together with observations made by other mem-
bers of Congress,160 shows that it was the extraordinary position
of the captain who commanded a vessel at sea, or one capable of
immediately going to sea, that justified denial of the court-martial
choice to his crew. Despite this legislative history, the Navy has
expanded the indicia of "attachment"16' and the meaning of "ves-
sel," 162 so that now a sailor attached to a ship absolutely incapa-
ble of getting underway for a year or more may not refuse
nonjudicial punishment. Nor may crew members assigned shore
duties refuse mast during the months when their submarine is
thousands of miles away.
The Navy did not discuss these practices during the 1962 hear-
158. Id. at 4913-14. For an account of an "unusual commanding officer," see N.
SHEEHAN, THE ARNm xER AnFARm (1971).
159. 1962 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 4914 (testimony of Captain Green-
berg, USN) (emphasis added).
160. The following typical observations were made by Congressmen on the
unique requirements of command at sea: "Because of testimony by the Navy, the
right to demand a trial by court-martial in lieu of nonjudicial punishment was not
extended to those aboard ship, in view of the unique responsibilities of the ship's
captain and in the interest in maintaining morale and discipline aboard ship." 108
CONG. REc. 17559 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Mansfield).
Iis is deterrent legislation. Now, he [the punished person] can always ap-
peal. Furthermore, he does not have to accept this punishment unless he is in the
Navy and a ship is generally out in the ocean and he cannot do anything about it."
Id at 8430 (remarks of Rep. Rivers) (emphasis added).
"It is not true in some cases [that a military person can refuse nonjudicial pun-
ishment] where a ship is at sea. That never has been so." Id. at 17560 (remarks of
Sen. Russell in response to a question by Sen. Douglas) (emphasis added).
161. The Navy has successfully argued, for example, that a person is attached
to a vessel if he has orders to that vessel, draws extra pay based on those orders,
uses the vessel's fleet post office address to receive mail, and is subject to recall to
the vessel He need not be living on board the ship either at sea or in port. Ben-
nett v. Tarquin, 466 F. Supp. 257 (D. Hawaii 1979); see also Jones v. Frudden, No.
74-2273 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1976) (sailor assigned to Navy ship undergoing repairs
in shipyard denied right to refuse nonjudicial punishment).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Forester, 8 M.J. 560 (N.C.MR. 1979) (a ship com-
missioned into the service of the Navy is at all times a 'vessel" for article 15
purposes).
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ings. Certainly the crew members of the submarine, USS Thomas
A. Edison, were not on the kind of "extended cruise" described
by Navy testimony when they requested and were denied courts-
martial. 63 These sailors were ashore in Hawaii, where it would
have been a simple matter to refer their cases to trial.
The captain who commands a ship high and dry for lengthy re-
pairs seems far removed from the "master of the ship" who must
bring her safely to port. And sailors attached to ships in drydock
do not appear sufficiently different from other land-based military
people to deny them the right to elect court-martial. In fact, many
of these sailors live in the 'decidedly civilian environment of
downtown hotels and suburban garden apartments while their
ships are repaired.164 Still, the Navy continues to deny them the
right to refuse mast if they fear the personalized justice of their
captain.
No doubt there are responsibilities unique to command at sea
that justify increased punishment authority. However, these re-
sponsibilities are greatly attenuated when ships sit in drydock,
gutted of the machinery that makes them steam, while crews rest
in hotels.
When ships are truly at sea, Congress believed they might not
have enough officers to convene a court-martial: "In the Army and
Air Force, the individual can refuse... punishment and demand
trial, although this privilege does not exist [in the Navy] because
of the problem ... at sea where there may not be enough officers
to convene a court."165 Today the Navy is able to find enough of-
ficers to convene courts when the captain decides that he, rather
than the accused, wants a trial. Large ships such as aircraft carri-
ers embark investigators, attorneys, and clerks necessary to hold
courts-martial. Court members (jury) are drawn from the more
than 100 officers on board.166
The decision, by a ship's captain to punish a sailor at mast or
refer his case to trial is not, of course, necessarily unfair or arbi-
trary. Congress endorsed the view that a senior officer, such as
the captain of an aircraft carrier, would have the "maturity and
163. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 148.
165. 1962 House Hearings, supra note 36, at 4900 (statement by Rep. Rivers).
166. See, e.g., Naval Legal Services Office, Norfolk, VA, message 031930Z of Nov.
1981 (confirming assignment of a Navy lawyer aboard the aircraft carrier Eisen-
hower to prosecute special courts-martial while ship is underway).
experience" needed to properly exercise the punishment author-
ity given him.167 The controversial punishment of confinement on
bread and water,168 for example, may only be awarded by the
commander of people attached to or embarked in his vessel. 6 9
Correctional custody, while not technically confinement, may
be awarded by a ship's captain for a period of thirty consecutive
days,1TO but may not be combined to run consecutively with the
maximum bread and water penalty.'71 Navy practice on board
ship, however, results in the functional if not legal equivalent of
combination. 7 2 This practice in at least one tragic instance raises
doubts that Congress should rely on the wisdom of ships' cap-
tains to humanely punish sailors by awarding them correctional
custody and confinement on bread and water. Moreover, action
taken by the Navy following the USS Ranger incident suggests
that abuse of article 15 authority was not limited to a single ship.
The Ranger Affair: Correctional Custody and Confinement on
Bread and Water
The military successfully lobbied for correctional custody as a
punishment that would achieve two goals. First, it would give
commanders a quasi-confinement power to deter illegal conduct;
second, it would provide rehabilitative counselling for the person
in custody. 73 The military represented the program as one
wherein the awardee would work at his usual job during the day,
and spend his off-duty time reflecting on his behavioral problem
in a setting less oppressive than a jail cell.174 A staff highly
trained in counselling techniques would guide this reflection:
"The Armed Forces have ... concentrated on developing an ef-
fective correctional treatment and evaluation capability in their
... rehabilitation facilities. They have placed a great deal of em-
phasis on special training... in correctional custody."175
167. See supra text accompanying note 13.
168. For examples of opposition to the bread and water punishment by vet-
eran's associations and lawyers' groups, see letter from John Finn, American Le-
gion, to Hon. Mendel Rivers (Apr. 5, 1962), reprinted in H.R REP. No. 1612, supra
note 2, at 7; Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1949) (testimony of Mr. Richard Wels,
chairman of a special committee on military justice of the N.Y. County Lawyers'
Association).
169. UCMT, art. 15(b) (2) (A), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (A) (1970).
170. Id., art. 15(b) (2) (H) (ii), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (H) (ii).
171. Id., art. 15(b) (2) (H), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (H).
172. See, e.g., iNfra text accompanying notes 185-87.
173. W. GENEROUS, JR., SWORDS AND ScALEs 140, 149 (1973).
174. Id. at 140.
175. S. REP. No. 1911, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2380, 2384.
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Congress, over the misgivings of some members, 76 authorized
correctional custody in the 1962 amendment. The maximum time
allowed in custody was thirty days if imposed by an officer in the
rank of major, lieutenant commander, or above. 77 Correctional
custody was defined as "the physical restraint... during duty or
non-duty hours and may include extra duties, fatigue duties, or
hard labor."178 The Executive order and Service regulations that
implement correctional custody underscore the remedial aspect
of this punishment. 7 9
In recent years the Navy has widened its use of correctional
custody. As of May 1981, fourteen correctional custody units had
been established aboard ships-including all aircraft carriers-
and fifteen units were operational ashore. 80 These units devel-
oped a reputation for tough discipline that was praised by the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, during a
1980 interview.' 8 ' Admiral Hayward said that some units had a
"70 percent turn-around rate." He added that many units he had
visited were "run a hell of a lot tougher than brigs."'1 82
176. Some Congressmen had a difficult time with the idea that a person could
be placed in a jail-like setting, yet not be "confined":
Mr. Bennett: What is the difference between correctional custody and
confinement? I mean is he going to be in a room with the walls ....
General Kuhfeld We define that-he is not supposed to be... treated
as a prisoner, but ... in an entirely different manner.
Mr. Hardy: That, I think, calls for a little further distinction.
Mr. Blandford [committee counsel]: In corrective custody he will report
to a place where he will spend the night. It may be the brig. But it will be
in a cell set aside from other prisoners.
1962 Houe Hearings, supra note 36, at 4929.
Committee members were also concerned that correctional custody did not
seem to be a minor punishment in keeping with the spirit of article 15:
Mr. Hardy- If it gets to the point where you have.., a sentence of 30
consecutive days of correctional custody, I get in a little trouble under-
standing how minor that might be.
General Kuhfeld. [I]t is 30 days corrective custody and not confine-
ment, but corrective custody, to straighten him out and get him to under-
stand what it is all about.
Id. at 4930.
177. UCMJ, art. 15(b) (2) (H) (ii), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b) (2) (H) (ii) (1970).
178. Id., art. 15(b), 10 U.S.C. § 815(b).
179. See, e.g., MCM, 1969, supra note 18, para. 131c; AR 27-10, para. 3-8c (Aug. 15,
1980); Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1640.7B, Mar. 18, 1976.
180. Navy Ships' Punishment Units Closed. San Diego Union, May 19, 1981, at
Al, col. 1.
181. Hayward, Barrow Tell JAG Conference of Need for Tighter Sea Service Dis.
cipline, Navy Times, Nov. 3, 1980, at 2.
182. Id. col 3.
Six months after this interview the Secretary of the Navy
closed all ship-board correctional custody units. He said he took
this action because "[Admiral Hayward] and I believe that some
of the current procedures and policies in regard to our ... correc-
tional custody units are not satisfactory .... ,1'83 The closings
were triggered by the death in April, 1981, of a sailor serving cor-
rectional custody aboard the aircraft carrier Ranger, and the
"number and intensity of ... allegations made by individuals
from different locations .... ,"184
Paul A. Trerice, twenty-one, was an enlisted member of Air An-
tisubmarine Squadron 37 embarked in the Ranger. 85 This 6-foot-
5-inch, 230-pound sailor had been confined to the ship's correc-
tional custody unit (CCU) after an article 15 hearing for an unau-
thorized absence in Hong Kong. During his custody, Airman
Trerice disobeyed an order given by a CCU "escort."186 He again
received an article 15 hearing and was ordered to solitary confine-
ment on bread and water.
This confinement is a means used by the Navy to compel those"
already in custody to accept the rigors of the CCU. Correctional
custody, as employed by the Navy aboard ship, may be inter-
rupted for punishment on bread and water. Time served during
the bread and water confinement does not count toward satisfac-
tion of the original custody award.187 Multiple confinements on
bread and water may therefore be ordered during a single, thirty-
day custody period.
In keeping with this process, Airman Trerice was returned to
the CCU and directed to do calisthentics for an hour on the flight
deck of the Ranger. The Ranger at this point was in port at Subic
Bay in the Philippines. Trerice could not complete the exercises
and became sick in the tropic heat. He asked to see a doctor. The
events that followed are in dispute, but the Navy acknowledges
183. San Diego Union, May 19, 1981, at Al, col 1.
184. Id
185. Except where otherwise noted, this description of the events surrounding
the death of Airman Recruit Trerice is taken from the Navy Times, May 11, 1981, at
2, cols. 1-4.
186. Guards in a Correctional Custody unit are called "escorts" and those con-
fined are called "awardees."
187. See Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 1640.7, § 301, para. 4b. (1981). In
a sworn statement, a Ranger sailor in the CCU described how the threat of punish-
ment on bread and water was used-
During... 2 1/2 hours I underwent extensive physical training, passing
out once from exhaustion only to be revived... with smelling salts so
that I could continue .... [The guard] accused me of lying [about leg
cramps] and threatened to PT me until I dropped .... [He told me] I
was going to bread and water.
Trerice Case: Navy Discipline is in the Dock, San Diego Union, May 24, 1981, at B5,
coL 1.
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that Airman Trerice struggled with his escorts, was forcibly re-
strained, and died before a doctor arrived. The autopsy showed
"dislocated fingers, scratches, bruises and scrapes .... " The
cause of death was stated as "heat stroke, specifically cardio-vas-
cular attack and respiratory failure.' 88
Navy investigations, demanded by Congressmen from Trerice's
home State of Michigan, have resulted in numerous charges
against officers and men of the Ranger. Senator Levin of Michi-
gan has also asked the Navy for any complaints made by sailors
given correctional custody aboard the oiler Ashtabula. A sailor in
custody aboard that ship was found dead in a river two days after
he had reportedly escaped.189
A veteran newspaper writer on military affairs gave the follow-
ing summary of mistreatment aboard the Ranger:
Men are herded into a room where guards have closed doors and other
accesses and have cut off fans that would provide ventilation.
Then the men inside are exercised to the point of exhaustion.
Some of them are slapped in the face, others are punched in the head
and stomach, some are choked into unconsciousness.
Some men confined to cells on a daily diet of bread and water are de-
prived of water but fed the bread.
Hispanics and other minorities confined for punishment are insulted in
vulgar and profane references to their racial origins.
These are instances of abuse recorded in and resulting from an official
investigation aboard the U.S. Navy ship Ranger.190
Based on this investigation, twenty-five enlisted men have been
charged with offenses ranging from assault to manslaughter.191
Charges against the executive officer and the supervising officer
of the CCU were referred to trial by general court-martial. The
executive officer was acquitted and the charges against the CCU
supervising officer were dismissed before trial.192 The senior
188. Navy Times, supra note 185, col. 3.
189. Id. col. 4.
190. Abuses on Ship Detailed, San Diego Union, Aug. 2, 1981, at Bl, cols. 1-2.
This article was written by Kip Cooper; a former Navy journalist and long-time
military affairs editor of the San Diego Union. Sydney Freedberg and David
Ashenfelter of the Detroit News also wrote extensive articles about the Ranger af-
fair. They won a Pulitzer gold medal for public service for these and other articles
about "the Navy's coverup of circumstances surrounding the deaths of seamen."
L.A. Times, Apr. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
191. Trerice Case Costing Navy over $50,000, San Diego Union, Nov. 30, 1981, at
B8, col 1.
192. San" Diego Union, Apr. 6, 1982, at Bl, col. 7. Accusations appeared in San
Diego and Los Angeles newspapers that senior officers aboard the Ranger knew of
the brutal treatment given sailors in the CCU. See, e.g., Abuse on Carrier: Execu-
petty officer in charge of the CCU was also acquitted.193 The cap-
tain of the Ranger received a non-punitive letter of reprimand
that is not made a part of his permanent record; he remains in
command of the ship.194 CCUs are once more open and a new
regulation has been issued on how they should be managed. 95
The Ranger affair and its aftermath demonstrates that the Navy
has in some tragic instances failed to act as Congress intended in
the areas of correctional custody and conifinement on bread and
water. CCUs are not places where people "go to spend the
night"196 after a normal work-day. The CCU is a place where
harsh methods are used that may well embitter rather than reha-
bilitate.197 New instructions do not guarantee that this will
tive Officer Tied to Curb on Criticism, San Diego Union, Sept. 11, 1981, at BI, col 1;
Navy Accused of Avoiding Open Hearings, San Diego Union, Aug. 29, 1981, at BI,
coL 1. The doctor aboard the Ranger when Airman Trerice died was quoted as
saying that he had seen bruises on other awardees before the death: "I was sur-
prised and shocked to see the bruises .... [Ift was like red flags." The doctor
said that he advised both the executive officer and the supervising officer for the
CCU about these bruises. He said that the executive officer warned the CCU en-
listed supervisors not to extend the awardees beyond their limits. Ex-Ranger Doc-
tor Tells His 'Shock', L.A Times, Oct. 2, 1981, pt. II, at 1, col. 1.
The captain of the Ranger was quoted as saying in support of the executive of-
ficer. "I am just flabbergasted about some of the allegations about the CCU ... I
absolutely guarantee you that I would not allow any physical abuse nor would
[the executive officer]." The captain blamed two sailors punished for drug dealing
as responsible for the public outcry about mistreatment aboard the Ranger:
"[The] Trerice case became a news item when two sailors were.., to be court-
martialed .... They became very public on the telephone. They never men-
tioned their own case. I believe it was to get back at the Ranger and to take the
heat off themselves." Ranger Skipper Testifies. . . Says 2 Sailors Stirred Abuse
Outcry, San Diego Union, Sept. 30, 1981, at B1, cols. 1-4
These two men claimed that they had received death threats after reporting that
they had been beaten by guards aboard the Ranger. Senator Levin of Michigan
fied a "threat-to-life" request with the Navy and a 24-hour protective guard was
provided. Navy Puts Guard on 2 Sailors After Death Threats, San Diego Union,
May 1, 1981, at A5, col 1.
193. Petty Officer Cleared in CCU Death, San Diego Union, Jan. 27, 1982, at Al,
col. 1.
194. Ranger Court-Martial Charges Tell of Brig Brutality, LA. Times, Aug. 1,
1981, pt. II, at 1, col 2. The captain received the letter for "inefficient exercise of
command supervision." Id. A 4.1 million-dollar civil suit has been filed against the
captain by Trerice's parents in federal district court. Four other crew-members
have also fied suit against the Navy for alleged mistreatment while confined in the
Ranger CCU. Id. at coL 6.
195. U.S. NAvY MANUAL FOR ADMNITRATION OF CORREcTIONAL CUSTODY UNrrs
(1981) (OPNAVINST. 1640.7).
196. See supra note 176 (remarks of Mr. Blandford).
197. Numerous public remarks by officers and men associated with the Ranger
affair support this conclusion. The following are typicah
Top Navy commanders demanded a "tough, physical Marine Corps Boot
camp environment .... [T]hey had a very strong interest in perpetuat-
ing it."
Navy Wanted Tough Brig, Hearing Told, L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1981, pt. A1 at 1, col. 5.
(argument by Navy attorney for enlisted man charged with manslaughter).
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change. For example, the new routine for people in custody is
still more severe, less flexible than that for so-called "brig rats."' 98
Worst of all, the use of confinement on bread and water is still im-
plicitly supported to ensure compliance with CCU discipline.199
There is, to be sure, an abundance of restrictions against mis-
treatment and an admonishment for escorts to report "incidents
which could result in embarrassment or focus public attention on
the correctional custody unit or the United States Navy."200
Many restrictions against mistreatment were on paper before
the excesses aboard the Ranger and perhaps other ships became
generally known. There is no persuasive reason to believe that a
fresh batch of regulations will, in the long run, be any more effec-
tive than the last. The best guarantee against abuse fostered by
the zeal to establish good order and discipline is for Congress to
limit by law what the Navy has failed to restrain through
regulation.
CONCLUSIONS AxD RECOMMENDATIONS
The Armed Forces do not administer article 15 as Congress in-
tended. Although the 1962 amendment explicitly limited the
scope and nature of nonjudicial punishment, sufficient ambiguity
Carrier sailors view the CCUs more like concentration camps than Navy
confinement centers .... "The system is antiquated... I always knew,
and so did many of my friends that someday, somewhere, somebody
would die there. People who are there deserve to be there, but not to be
dehumanized or herded around and punished in the extreme."
Trerice Case: Navy Discipline is in the Dock, San Diego Union, May 24, 1981, at B4,
col. 4 (remarks by sailor who had observed CCUs in operation but had never been
punished in one).
The objective is to retrain you to be a four-O, squared-away sailor...
And they expect to accomplish this by humiliating you in front of your
shipmates. They treat you like dogs. They push you around and expect
you to show some respect. When I got out of the CCU I hated the Navy all
that much more.
Id. at B4, coL 4, B5, col. 1 (remarks by ex-awardee punished in the Ranger CCU).
198. Weekdays for both the brig and CCU begin at 4.30 a.m. and end at 9:30 p.m.
During the day, however, the brig prisoner has more time to eat, receives a hot
meal at noon rather than a box lunch, and has a recreation period of approxi-
mately one hour that is denied the awardee. The prisoner also spends one-third
less time at physical training. Compare U.S. NAVY MANuAL FOR THE ADmIsmTRA-
TION OF NAVY BRIGS, enclosure (2), at 1 (1981) (OPNAVINST 1640.6) with U.S.
NAVY MANUAL FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL CUSTODY UNIS, at C-1
(1981) (OPNAVINST 1640.7).
199. See U.S. NAVY MANUAL FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF COREcTIONAL Cus-
TODY UNiTs, § 301, para. 4b. (1981) (OPNAVINST 1640.7).
200. I. § 306, para. 3.
remains in the statute that permits the Services to frustrate its re-
habilitative spirit. Regulatory expansion of the term "Minor"
gives the commander jurisdiction over too many offenses. This
expanded jurisdiction often does not protect the accused, but
works against him through denial of safeguards available at a
court-martial. The problem is particularly acute for people at-
tached to or embarked in vessels, because they may not elect trial
instead of nonjudicial punishment.
Article 15 action as recorded and used may stigmatize the
awardee in a manner very similar to that of a court-martial con-
viction. Article 15 records are used to increase courts-martial
sentences and to diminish employment opportunities in both the
public and private sectors. These records are often maintained in
fies where they permanently threaten the security and impair the
morale of the person punished.
Women in the Navy and officers in all Services are particularly
vulnerable to the harmful effects of nonjudicial punishment. The
Navy jails women in federal penitentiaries for minor offenses
dealt with in summary fashion. This jailing creates a national ar-
rest record, fingerprints and photographs are sent to the FBI just
as if the woman had been booked on a felony complaint. Such a
record is widely recognized as an impediment with serious eco-
nomic, social, and legal consequences. Military officers, caught up
in an increasingly competitive profession, may have their careers
truncated or ruined altogether by a single article 15 punishment.
People attached to or embarked in vessels suffer particularly
harsh measures under article 15. These measures have led to se-
rious injury and death. People aboard ships do not have the same
rights as others in the military to demand a court-martial rather
than article 15. The arguments in favor of this unequal, poten-
tially dangerous treatment are no longer persuasive for a modern,
peace-time Navy.
Congress should act to remove the ambiguities that now burden
article 15; such action should place this proceeding squarely
within the spirit and purpose of the 1962 amendment. This could
be accomplished by further statutory amendment that would:
1. Adopt the federal, felony-misdemeanor distinction as the di-
viding line for minor and serious -crimes;
2. Permit the commander to treat specified serious offenses,
such as possession and use of marijuana, as minor with the
requirement that he set forth in writing his reasons for this
treatment;
3. Prohibit the use of nonjudicial punishment to increase a sen-
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tence at a subsequent court-martial, unless the accused
claims a record free from disciplinary action;
4. Require destruction of all nonjudicial punishment records af-
ter two years;
5. Prohibit use of nonjudicial punishment records for adminis-
trative discharges if counsel was not available at the article
15 hearing;
6. Prohibit the jailing of women awardees in federal
penitentiaries;.
7. Permit military people to choose court-martial in lieu of non-
judicial punishment when attached to or embarked in a ves-
sel under one or more of the following circumstances:
a. The vessel is in drydock for repairs that require six
weeks or more to complete;20l
b. The person charged is a member of a submarine "off"
crew physically stationed ashore;
c. The captain of the vessel has established a courts-martial
panel to try offenses at the option of the government;
8. Prohibit operation of correctional custody units aboard ship;
9 Remove confinement on bread and water as a punishment;
10. Establish a civilian inspector general within the legislative
branch to monitor administration of nonjudicial punishment.
These measures, if adopted in whole or in part, would do much
to bring military practice into line with congressional precept for
use of the article 15 power.
WILLIAM R. SALISBURY
201. If a ship is in a yard for repairs that take more than six weeks, all ammuni-
tion must be offloaded. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, AMMUNIToN AFLOAT, para. 2-53B
(1979) (NAVSEA OP 4, Vol 2, fifth rev.). The repairs, routinely accomplished by
civilian workers, are so extensive that they cannot be safely made without disman-
tling the ship's war-making plant Of course a ship torn apart in this manner is
incapable of performing a military mission. The military necessity argument for
denying a sailor the right to court-martial in such circumstances is therefore
unpersuasive.

